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Abstract
This article is concerned with an exploration of a family of systems—
called immune logics—whose main properties are, in some sense, re-
lated to those of the well-known family of infectious logics. The dis-
tinctive feature of the semantic of infectious logics is the presence of
a certain “infectious” semantic value, i.e. a value which is a zero
element for all the operations in the underlying algebraic structure.
On the other hand, what is characteristic of the semantic of immune
logics is to have a certain “immune” value, i.e. an identity element
for the binary operations in the underlying algebraic structure. In
this article, we will define these structures, focusing on the 3-element
case, discuss the relations between immune and infectious elements,
and provide technical results regarding them, and the various logical
systems defined using such semantics.
1 Introduction
In the past few years, there has been an increasing amount of attention paid
to a family of many-valued systems called infectious logics. These systems
usually have a truth-value behaving in an infectious way, by which we mean
that this value is a zero element (alternatively, annihilating, or absorbing
element) for all the operations in the underlying algebraic structure.
The aim of this article is to explore some structures which are somewhat
related to infectious logics, leading to systems that we will call immune logics
for obvious reasons. Thus, with the purpose of conducting this investigation,
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the article is structured as follows. In section 2, we present algebras with
infectious elements and discuss some of their characteristic properties. In sec-
tion 3, we devote ourselves to the examination of the 3-element algebras with
an universal idempotent immune element, leading us to discuss operations al-
ready introduced in other contexts by Sobociński, Ebbinghaus, Cooper, and
others. In section 4, we consider different logical systems that can be defined
over the infectious and the immune semantics, also exploring some applica-
tions that can be entertained as regards subject-matter preservation. Finally,
in section 5 we wrap up our investigation with some concluding remarks and
directions for future work.
2 Infectious Logics
In this section, we discuss the formal details underlying the so-called infec-
tious logics. As we briefly said before, systems of this sort are induced by
logical matrices whose algebraic reduct is an algebra having an infectious or
absorbing element. This element can be seen as a universal zero element,
as well as an element working in a value-in-value-out fashion. In fact, these
two different approximations can be seen to be equivalent as noted in the
definitions below, taken from [31] and [10].
Definition 2.1. An algebra A has an infectious element m if and only if for
every n-ary operation ¶ of A, and every {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A:
if m ∈ {a1, . . . , an}, then ¶A(a1, . . . , an) = m
In this article we will be focusing on algebras having the 2-element Boolean
algebra as a proper subalgebra. For this purpose, it is interesting to have in
mind the definition of an extension of an arbitrary algebra with an infectious
element.
Definition 2.2. Given an algebra A, the algebra A[m] is its extension with
an infectious element m /∈ A, such that for all n-ary operations ¶ of A[m]
and all {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A ∪ {m}:
¶A[m](a1, . . . , an) =
{
m if m ∈ {a1, . . . , an}
¶A(a1, . . . , an) otherwise
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In this vein, it is key to focus on the smallest structure containing an
infectious element which also extends the 2-element Boolean algebra. This
structure is usually referred to as the week Kleene algebra (WK algebra,
for short), whose operations can be depicted in the truth-tables appearing in





∧WK t u f
t t u f
u u u u
f f u f
∨WK t u f
t t u t
u u u u
f t u f
Figure 1: The weak Kleene truth-tables
As regards the algebraic reduct of a logical matrix of any sort, it is usually
customary to study what kind of structure it constitutes. For example, the
algebraic structure underlying the two-valued semantics for Classical Logic
is a Boolean algebra, as we said before—that is to say, a complemented
bounded distributive lattice. In this respect, it is interesting to highlight
that the weak Kleene algebra is a (generalized) involutive bisemilattice—see
[24] and references therein.
By this we mean, a structure with a unary operation (which we may
call ¬) and two binary operations (which we may call ∧ and ∨) behaving
in the following way. First, both ∧ and ∨ induce partial orders (which we
may refer to as ≤∧WK and ≤∨WK), and ¬ is an involution in both of these
orders. Secondly, the absorption laws do not hold for these operations or,
equivalently, these orders are not each other’s inverse. Thus, conjunction can
be seen as the minimum of an order, because x ≤∧WK y iff x ∧WK y = x.
Also, disjunction can be seen as the maximum of an order, because x ≤∨WK y
iff x ∨WK y = y. But these orders are not the same. Thus, the order
≤∧WK associated with the WK conjunction has a maximum, it just happens
that this maximum is not the WK disjunction. Similarly, the order ≤∨WK
associated with the WK disjunction has a minimum, it just happens that
this minimum is not the WK conjunction. A graphical depiction of the
3-element WK algebra as a structure of this sort can be observed in the
Figure 2.
One of the important things for us in this work is to consider logics built
on top of the WK algebra. For this purpose, we will analyze two well-known
infectious logics that are subsystems of Classical Logic—the logics Kw3 and










Figure 2: The WK algebra as a generalized involutive bisemilattice
are respectively non-transitive and non-reflexive. We will do this however
in a later section, where we will also compare them to systems built on the
algebras with immune elements that we will discuss in the next section.
Infectious logics have received many interpretations in the literature. Al-
though in the recent years novel epistemic, computational, topic-related, and
even metaphysical readings have been discussed, the most standard one is
semantic—see [18], [17], [14], [4], [15]. It dates from the early discussions of
the last century, revolving around set-theoretic and semantics paradoxes.
Thus, according to some scholars—among which we saliently find Bochvar
[5] and Halldén [20], but also Goddard and Routley [19]—the statements
comprising the paradoxes constitute nonsensical or rather meaningless sen-
tences. That is to say, expressions which despite being grammatical did
not convey a meaning or express a proposition at all. It was the opinion
of these authors that conjugating meaningless sentences with a meaningful
sentence only resulted in a meaningless sentence because it was impossible
for something to be meaningful and have a component lacking meaning. In
fewer words, meaninglessness has an infectious behavior. It is easy to observe
that the operations resulting from a system allowing for true, false (in either
case, meaningful) and meaningless sentences, are faithfully represented by
the operations of the weak Kleene algebra.
With the technical and conceptual remarks on infectious logics over, we
now move on to the main topic of our article: immune logics.
3 Immune logics
There seems to be an equally interesting class of logics, related to that of the
infectious logics, which (apart from a few exemptions, which we will mention)
have been somehow neglected in the contemporary literature—we will call
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them immune logics.
While infectious logics are characterized by having an all-purpose zero
element, immune logics are by having an all-purpose identity element, or at
least an element that can be thus regarded for all binary operations. In the
case of binary operations, whatever elements are conjugated with an identity
element, the result of that operation is the remaining element. Notice that
this implies that when the inputs of some binary operation are only the
identity element, the output is the identity element. If, additionally, we
assume that idempotency holds for all unary operations—and we only have
these kind of operations in the algebra in question—this justifies calling the
involved elements universally idempotent immune elements.1
Definition 3.1. An algebra A has a universally idempotent immune element
m if and only if for every n-ary operation ¶ of A, and every {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A:
if {m} ( {a1, . . . , an}, then ∗ (a1, . . . , an) = aj 6= m
if {m} = {a1, . . . , an}, then ∗ (a1, . . . , an) = m
In what follows, we will be dealing with 3-element algebras. Thus, one
would like to conceive a method to extend arbitrary algebras with universally
idempotent immune elements, as we did in the Definition 2.2 for the infectious
elements. However, as we will see this is not as easy as it initially seems.
Assume we have any algebra A, and we would like to obtain the algebra
which is its extension with a universally-idempotent immune element, call it
A[m] (with m /∈ A). The most natural way to do it would be to define the
n-ary operations ¶ of A[m] and all {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A ∪ {m} in the following
way:
¶A[m](a1, . . . , an) =

aj 6= m if {m} ( {a1, . . . , an}
m if {m} = {a1, . . . , an}
¶A(a1, . . . , an) otherwise
1As we will see, we will not assume that the idea of an all-purpose identity element can
be generalized so as to apply to algebras having arbitrary n-ary operations. Everything
we claim in this article can be understood as restricted to algebras containing, at most,
binary operations.
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However, notice that A[m] is not well-defined, since the first condition
states that ¶A[m](a1, . . . , an) = aj 6= m if {m} ( {a1, . . . , an}. However, if we
have a ternary operation ◦(a1,m, a2) with a1 6= m 6= a2, the instruction does
not determine one single algebra, since it only requires that ◦(a1,m, a2) 6= m,
but it does not decide between a1 and a2.
2 This point, of course, can be gen-
eralized to arbitrary n-ary operations, when n ≥ 3. For these reasons, in this
article we will not define extensions of arbitrary algebras with universally-
idempotent immune elements, but we will only restrict our investigations to
the 3-element case with unary and binary operations.3
Below we depict the unique 3-element algebra with an universally idempo-
tent immune element having the 2-element Boolean algebra as a subalgebra.
This structure was presented by Sobociński in [28], and, for this reason, we
call it the 3-element Sobociński algebra, appearing in Figure 3. Incidentally,
these operations are also discussed in works by Ebbinghaus, and Finn and





∧S t u f
t t t f
u t u f
f f f f
∨S t u f
t t t t
u t u f
f t f f
Figure 3: The Sobociński truth-tables
It is interesting to observe a couple of things with regard to the ordered
structure induced by these operations. Firstly, if we take conjunction to be
the minimum of the order≤∧S and disjunction to be the maximum of the order
≤∨S it constitutes another generalized involutive bisemilattice, as portrayed
in Figure 4. This is similar to what happened in the case of the weak Kleene
algebra. Secondly, this generalized involutive bisemilattice is such that the
≤∧S order here corresponds to the ≤∨WK order in the WK algebra, whereas
the ≤∨S order here corresponds to the ≤∧WK order in the WK algebra. So,
in a way these structures are closely intertwined and can be properly seen as
symmetric.
Before closing this section, let us say a few words on possible interpre-
tations of these operations. The first interpretation—which is novel to this
2We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us.
3A possible solution to this problem would be to use non deterministic algebras. Al-










Figure 4: The S algebra as a generalized involutive bisemilattice
article, as far as we know—is inspired in the meaninglessness interpretation
provided for the weak Kleene algebra. The idea is the following. While the
interpretation based on WK considers that nonsensical sentences are infec-
tious, we could argue that nonsensical sentences are innocuous regarding the
semantics. From a semantical point of view, they are like noise or interfer-
ence. So, nonsensical sentences are evaluated as semantically ineffective, in
the sense that they do not add semantic content to the meaningful sentences
which they are combined with. In the context of the WK algebra we can in-
terpret meaninglessness as a phenomenon that propagates. One nonsensical
sentence is enough to contaminate, to infect the whole context. On the other
hand, the proposal we’re suggesting consists in considering meaninglessness
as a phenomenon that should be encapsulated. We should omit nonsensical
parts when evaluating the semantic value of a compound sentence. Of course,
here we’re simply outlining a possible new application for these operations
and although interesting, a fully developed story of this application should
wait for another occasion.
An established interpretation, perhaps of the sort that we outlined before,
was proposed by Humberstone. In [21, p.1051] the author mentions that
the conjunction and disjunction operations of the Sobociński algebra can be
motivated in the context of the theory of emotivism, i.e., the theory that
claims that moral judgments lacks of cognitive meaning—and are therefore
neither true nor false—but only have emotive meaning. In particular, using
a passage from Ayer [1], he motivates this meaninglessness reading, claiming
their lack of truth conditions does not deprive the complex sentence thereof.
So, for example, the truth conditions of a conjunctive sentence like “Today is
Sunday and stealing is wrong” are identical to those of the first conjunct—and
similarly, if it was a disjunction. Naturally, if all components of a complex
sentence one of the sort, the sentence will not express a proposition and
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therefore it will not be true or false. It is easy to observe that the operations
resulting from a system allowing for true, false and neither true nor false
sentences of this sort, are faithfully represented by the operations of the
Sobociński algebra.
Going back to our original plan, in the next section we will consider some
consequence relations that can be defined over the algebras we have been
considering, and we will mention some of their salient features.
4 Consequence relations
The aim of this section is to analyze the different logics induced by consider-
ing different consequence relations over 3-element algebras with infectious or,
respectively, with immune elements. For this purpose, we will consider the
framework laid out by Cobreros, Égré, Ripley, van Rooij, Chemla, Spector,
and others, where so-called mixed consequence relations are defined—see,
e.g., [6], [7], and [11].
Consequence relations of this form generalize the usual regular matrix
consequence relations, where logical consequence is defined in terms of the
preservation of a set of designated values. In the mixed case, there are pairs
of sets of designated values and logical consequence is not understood in
terms of the preservation of the members of any of them. Instead, the idea
is that if all of the premises receive values in the set of designated values for
premises, then some of the conclusions must receive a truth-value in the set
of the designated values for conclusions. We take the following definitions
from [6].
Definition 4.1. A mixed consequence relation is a relation noted Dp,Dc ,
such that Γ Dp,Dc ∆ if and only if for every valuation v, v(γ) /∈ Dp for some
γ ∈ Γ or v(δ) ∈ Dc for some δ ∈ ∆.
So, depending on how we choose the sets Dp,Dc we can make further
distinctions.
Definition 4.2. We will call a mixed consequence relation pure if and only
if Dp = Dc. Otherwise, we’ll call it impure.
Also, we will focus not simply on mixed consequence relations, but on
the intersection between them.
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Definition 4.3. An intersective mixed consequence relation D1p,D1c ∩ ... ∩ Dnp ,Dnc
is an intersection of mixed consequence relations (i.e., for each i, Dip,Dic is a
mixed consequence relation).
So, these definitions are quite general. In particular, usually a set of
designated values is not any subset of the set of semantic values, but an
upset. In the 3-element case, using the order f ≤ u ≤ t, we could think as
a set of designated values a set including t and not including f .4 However,
here we are not restricting ourselves to this condition, since the consequence
relations that do not respect it show very interesting properties. In view of
this, the plan of the section is as follows. In the Section 4.1 we will present the
logics that respect this condition. Next, in Section 4.2 we will consider some
consequence relations that do not obey this restriction. In both sections, we
will compare the resulting consequence relations over each of the algebras
previously discussed.
4.1 Restricting the sets of designated values
When working with a 3-element algebra that has the 2-element Boolean alge-
bra as a subalgebra, and assuming that the sets of designated values contain
t but not f , one can consider two possible sets of designated values s = {t}
and t = {t,u}. With this in mind, it is immediate to define four mixed con-
sequence relations. In terms of [7], two pure and two impure: s,s, t,t, s,t
and t,s, or more simply ss, tt, st, and ts consequence relations—referred to
in this way for obvious reasons. The first two of these are usually understood
as the preservation of truth, and preservation of non-falsity respectively.
Let us now proceed to inspect the four different logics resulting from
considering these consequence relations over the weak Kleene algebra WK.
To begin with, we can first focus on the logic induced by the ss and tt
consequence relations over this algebra. these logics already quite well-known
and have received a lot of attention at least in the past years. Respectively,
they are called the paracomplete weak Kleene logic Kw3 and the paraconsistent
weak Kleene logic PWK—see, e.g., [22], [20], [8], [10].
These systems have quite distinctive features. The paracomplete one is
such that the Law of Excluded Middle fails in it, as well as the rather intuitive
rule of Addition, or Disjunction Introduction. In a sort of dual manner, the
4Actually, in [6] the authors consider the set of designated values in this way.
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paraconsistent one is such that Explosion is invalid in it, while also the highly
intuitive rule of Simplification, or Conjunction Elimination is.
ψ 2WKss ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ ϕ 2WKss ϕ ∨ ψ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ 2WKtt ψ ϕ ∧ ψ 2WKtt ϕ
In fact, it is known that these features can be rather seen as emerging
symptoms of a deeper comprehension of these logics. A number of different
scholars have worked out exhaustive characterizations of the set of valid
inferences of these logics, which make it easier to understand what holds in
them—for references, see [33], [8], [9], [10], [23].
ϕ WKss ψ iff
{
ϕ CL ψ and V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ), or
ϕ CL χ for all χ
ϕ WKtt ψ iff
{
ϕ CL ψ and V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(ψ), or
χ CL ϕ for all χ
Turning now to the properly mixed consequence relations defined over
the weak Kleene algebra, it is important to notice that the logics induced by
these considerations have not received a similar amount of attention in the
specialized literature. To be more precise, the logic induced by considering
the st consequence relation over this algebra only is a subject of debate in
less than a handful of articles, while the logic induced by considering the ts
consequence relation has not been subject to discussion at all. This being
said, let us proceed to examine some of the interesting properties of these
systems.
Starting with the st consequence relation leads us to consider the logic
dubbed weak ST or wST in the recent literature—see [32]. Before going
into its characteristic features, it is important to observe that the set of
valid inferences on this logic is exactly the set of valid inferences of Classical
Logic. A proof of this fact can be easily grasped by noticing the following
two facts. Firstly, if an inference Γ  ∆ has a counterexample in wST then
it is classically invalid. The reason for this is that a WK-valuation v is a
counterexample of Γ  ∆ if and only if v(γ) = t for every γ ∈ Γ and v(δ) = f
for every δ ∈ ∆. Since the value u is infectious and the WK-valuations
restricted to the classical inputs behave as the classical valuations, it is easy
to see that this valuation can be transformed into a classical counterexample
to the same inference. On the other hand, if an inference Γ  ∆ has a classical
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counterexample, there must be a classical valuation v such that v(γ) = t for
every γ ∈ Γ and v(δ) = f for every δ ∈ ∆. By inspecting the algebra WK it
is easy to check that this valuation is a counterexample to the same inference
in wST.
Be that as it may, it thus seems this logic has no particular quirks in what
pertains to its set of valid inferences, whence we may seek for some of its
peculiarities in higher inferential levels—particularly, at the metainferential
level. Metainferences are inferences between inferences themselves, and as
such can be regarded as valid or invalid in a system—see, e.g., [27], [2]. In
what follows to evaluate whether a metainference is valid or not we will use
the so-called local metainferential validity standard discussed for example in
[12] and [2], defined as follows:
Definition 4.4. A metainference is locally valid in a given logic L if and
only if every valuation v which is a counterexample of the conclusion is also
a counterexample of some of the premises.
So, as the notion of counterexample depends on the logic L, different
logics can locally validate different metainferences. In this regard, as in the
case of the system induced by taking the st consequence relation over the
strong Kleene algebra, the rule of Cut is also invalid in the infectious logic
wST:
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
This can be observed by taking a formula ϕ receiving the intermediate
value u. Furthermore, it is immediate to observe that the two elimination
metainferences akin to the ones invalid in PWK are invalid in wST. These
are the left disjunction elimination metainferences, and the right conjunction
elimination metainference.5
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ψ,∆
5Any WK-valuation such that v(ϕ) = t and v(ψ) = u is a counterexample to the first
metainference, and any valuation such that v(ϕ) = u and v(ψ) = t is a counterexample
to the second one. Similarly, it’s easy to find counterexamples to the third and the fourth
ones.
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We will comment on the fact that this may happen as the result of a
deeper characterization of the notion of metainferential validity for wST, at
the end of this section.
Moving on now to the logic induced by considering the ts consequence
relation over the weak Kleene algebra, resulting in a system we call wTS, we
must stress the number of caveats. First of all, in the case of the logic induced
by considering these consequence relation over the strong Kleene algebra,
called TS in [11], the resulting system has no inferential validities. These
can be easily noticed by pointing out the fact that the valuation giving the
intermediate value to every formula is a counterexample to every inference
formulated in the language. This further implies the fact that the rule of
Reflexivity is invalid in this system. Again, the standard for assessing the
validity of metainferences is the local one.
ϕ⇒ ϕ
On top of these considerations, it is interesting to note that further
metainferences are also invalid in this system. To wit, the right disjunc-
tion introduction metainference, as well as the left conjunction introduction
metainference are invalid in this logic.6
Γ⇒ ϕ, ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ,∆
Γ, ϕ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ ∆
Once more, we will comment on the fact that this may happen as the
result of a deeper characterization of the notion of metainferential validity
for wTS, connecting it to Kw3 , at the end of this section.
Let us turn our attention to the different logics that can be defined over
the Sobociński algebra S, by considering the four consequence relations pre-
viously mentioned. As far as we know, some of these logics were not consid-
ered so far in the literature. So, first, let’s begin with the pure consequence
relations, ss and tt. To remark their salient features, we can call them
respectively the paracomplete Sobociński logic So3 and the paraconsistent
Sobociński PSo3.
As in the weak Kleene systems, of course, in the paracomplete case the
Law of Excluded Middle fails, and in the paraconsistent one, the rule of
6To see this, any WK-valuation such that v(ϕ) = t and v(ψ) = u is a counterexample
to the first metainference. Also, any WK-valuation such that v(ϕ) = f and v(ψ) = u is a
counterexample to the second one.
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Explosion fails. However, contrary to what happens with the weak Kleene
case, it is in the paraconsistent logic in which the rule of Addition fails,
whereas in the paracomplete case the rule of Simplification does not hold7:
ψ 2Sss ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ ϕ ∧ ψ 2Sss ϕ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ 2Stt ψ ϕ 2Stt ϕ ∨ ψ
So, one could be inclined to think that as in the weak Kleene logics,
these systems characterize some syntactically interesting fragment of Classi-
cal Logic. For instance, from the inspection of the above examples, one could
think that So3 and PSo3 are defined by the following:
ϕ Sss ψ iff
{
ϕ CL ψ and V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(ψ), or
ϕ CL χ for all χ
ϕ Stt ψ iff
{
ϕ CL ψ and V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ), or
χ CL ϕ for all χ
However, the following inference: ψ ∧ ϕ  ϕ ∨ ¬ψ is a counterexample
to this conjecture, since it is invalid both in So3 and PSo3, but nonetheless
is classically valid and the propositional variables in the premise and in the
conclusion are the same (take any S-valuation v, such that v(ϕ) = u and
v(ψ) = t). Of course, this does not imply that a syntactic characterization
of these systems is not possible, but only that we are not aware of it.
Let’s move on to the mixed consequence relations defined over S. The
first one to consider is the st consequence relation, which we can call sST.
It’s worth noticing that contrary to the weak Kleene case, the set of valid
inferences of this logic is a proper subset of the set of classically valid infer-
ences. So, although it’s easy to check that the following inferences are valid
in sST:
ψ Sst ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ ϕ ∧ ψ Sst ϕ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ Sst ψ ϕ Sst ϕ ∨ ψ
the following for instance are not8:
7Any S-valuation such that v(ϕ) = u and v(ψ) = t is a counterexample to the first
and the second metainferences, and any S-valuation such that v(ϕ) = u and v(ψ) = f is
a counterexample to the third and the fourth ones.
8To see this, take a S-valuation v, such that v(ϕ) = u, v(χ) = t and v(ψ) = f .
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χ ∧ (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) 2Sst ψ χ Sst ψ ∨ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)
And thus, sST does not coincide with Classical Logic. However, at the level
of the metainferences there is some symmetry to the weak Kleene case. First,
it’s trivial to note that since the logic is non-transitive (as wST) the following
metainference is invalid:
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
However, it is worth noticing that the elimination metainferences which
were invalid in wST (and valid in wTS) are valid in sST. And surprisingly,
the introduction metainferences (which are invalid in wTS, and valid in wST)
are also invalid in this logic9:
Γ⇒ ϕ, ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ,∆
Γ, ϕ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ ∆
As we said before, below we will comment on the fact that this may hap-
pen as the result of a deeper characterization of the notion of metainferential
validity for sST.
Let’s consider now the logic induced by taking the ts consequence relation
on the Sobociński algebra. This logic, which we will call sTS was never
considered in the literature. It’s easy to check that as in the wTS, the logic
sTS has no valid inferences. In particular, reflexivity, or identity, fails:
ϕ⇒ ϕ
But, what about the metainferences of this logic? Here we have a similar
situation as the described for the case of sST. The following metainferences
which are wST invalid (but wTS valid) are sTS invalid10:
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ψ,∆
9The valuation v such that v(ϕ) = v(ψ) = u, v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = t and v(ϕ ∨ ψ) = f is a
counterexample to both of them.
10The valuation v, v(ϕ ∨ ψ) = f , and v(ϕ) = u is a counterexample to the first one.
Dually, the valuation v, v(ϕ ∨ ψ) = f , and v(ψ) = u is a counterexample to the second
one. The valuation v, v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = t, and v(ϕ) = u is a counterexample to the third one.
And lastly, the valuation v, v(ϕ∧ψ) = t, and v(ψ) = u is a counterexample to the fourth
one.
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So, the metainferences that represent elimination rules for the connectives
are invalid. Is this a symptom of a greater ongoing phenomenon? Let’s
discuss this not only as pertains to sTS, but all the other st and ts-based
logics.
Some very interesting observations have been made in the recent couple
of years by researchers investigating the st consequence relation over three-
valued logics, and some highly plausible conjectures have been concomitantly
floated regarding the ts consequence relation over similar systems. These
observations concern the characterization of those metainferences valid in
the st and ts systems. By this we mean, description of the sufficient and
necessary conditions for a metainference to be valid in these systems, in
terms of conditions which do not make reference to their obvious definitions.
Some works even refer to these characterizations as representation theorems
of sorts.
The stepping point for these reflections is the discussion of the set of valid
metainferences of the logic induced by taking the st notion of logical con-
sequence over the strong Kleene algebra—thus rendering the system usually
known as ST. Researchers—among them, saliently [3], [2], and [12]—have
pointed out that the set of valid metainferences of this logic can be character-
ized, via some appropriate translations, in terms of the set of valid inferences
of the logic induced by taking the tt notion of logical consequence over the
strong Kleene algebra. In the wake of these results, some have conjectured
that there is a similar relation between the set of valid metainferences of the
logic induced by taking the ts notion of logical consequence over the strong
Kleene algebra (thus rendering the system usually known as TS) and the
set of valid inferences of the logic induced by taking the ss notion of logical
consequence over the set algebra—although no exhaustive proof is found in
the literature.
Given these results, one may conjecture that the logics induced by apply-
ing these standards for logical consequence over there weak Kleene algebra
and, respectively, the Sobociński algebra will be similarly related. To this
extent, we may confirm that such a connection between wST and PWK has
been recently established in [25]. Whether it is possible to produce simi-
lar proofs for the case of the remaining systems is as of today, yet to be
determined.
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4.2 Relaxing the sets of designated values
In the last section, we have defined some mixed consequence relations over
the weak Kleene and the Sobociński algebra, and we have remarked some
of their salient properties. In particular, we have shown some similarities
and differences between the logics based on these two algebras. One of the
main differences consists in the fact that logics based on the weak Kleene
algebra have shown to be especially suitable to formulate or to capture some
fragments of Classical Logic—for instance, as we have seen, this is true for
WKss and 
WK




tt are not adequate in
the same way.11
In this section, we will show that using some mixed consequence relations
other than those reviewed in the last section we can obtain a positive result
regarding the notion of (logical) subject-matter preservation and, further-
more, of content inclusion. In particular, we will show that by relaxing the
restriction for the sets of designated values of containing t and not contain-
ing f , we can define logics over the weak Kleene and the Sobociński algebras
which allow us to capture exactly the valid inferences of any logic that respect
content inclusion from premises to conclusions, and a similar phenomenon
from conclusions to premises.
For the purpose of this analysis, we will have in mind an account of con-
tent inclusion due to Yablo in [34, p. 1-4]. He argues that content inclusion
as a relation between propositions is characterized in terms of the joint satis-
faction of truth preservation and subject-matter preservation between them.
Granting the assumption that the (logical) subject-matter of a proposition
is to be formally represented by the set of propositional variables appear-
ing in it, these considerations can have a formal life of their own. In fact,
subject-matter preservation from ϕ to ψ could be represented by the claim
that V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ)—otherwise known as Parry’s Proscriptive Principle,
for which see [26].12 Furthermore, since paradigmatically the notion of logi-
cal consequence incarnated in Classical Logic can be understood in terms of
truth preservation, the joint satisfaction of classical entailment and the Pro-
11In the sense that, as we mentioned, for instance the following inference ψ∧ϕ  ϕ∨¬ψ
is invalid both in So3 and PSo3, although it is classically valid and premises and conclusion
share the propositional variables.
12By no means do we intend to claim that variable-sharing or variable-inclusion is a nec-
essary or sufficient condition for relevance. We only wanted to report that some researchers
thought that variable-inclusion could be a guide, and perhaps even a necessary condition,
for the formalization of the notion of content inclusion from premises to conclusion.
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scriptive Principle characterizes a Yablovian approach to content inclusion
in Classical Logic. However, this can be further generalized. If the notion of
logical consequence of a given logic L can be allegedly understood in terms of
truth preservation, content inclusion in L could be characterized as follows:
ϕ L ψ and V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ). Although these philosophical remarks do
not straightforwardly carry over to the case of subject-matter preservation
from conclusion to premises, the previous reflections are interesting enough
for similar and related systems to be intriguing in their own right.
Let us now go ahead and see how all these relates to infectious and im-
mune logics. So, let’s first define the following two sets of truth-values:
d = {t, f}, and d = {u}. With these two sets we can define new mixed
consequence relations: d,d, d,d, d,d,d,d, or more simply dd, dd, dd and
dd consequence relations. In what follows we will not consider the conse-
quence relations dd and dd defined over both algebras, because they result
in empty logics.13 Regarding the other consequence relations we can obtain
the following facts:
Fact 4.5. Variable inclusion can be defined over weak Kleene as follows:
ϕ WKdd ψ iff V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ)
ϕ WK
dd
ψ iff V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(ψ)
Proof. We first prove that: ϕ WKdd ψ iff V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ).
If: By reductio, assume V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ) but ϕ 2WKdd ψ. Then, there
is a WK-valuation v, such that v(ϕ) ∈ {t, f} but v(ψ) = u. It’s
straightforward to prove by induction that if v(ψ) = u there must be
some propositional variable p ∈ V ar(ψ) such that v(p) = u. But since
V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ), hence p ∈ V ar(ϕ), and therefore because of the
infectiousness of u, v(ϕ) = u, which contradicts our initial assumption.




these consequence relations are empty since any valuation
which assigns to every propositional variable a classical value will be a counterexample of
any inference, since no formula will receive the intermediate value (and therefore satisfy





relations, since the valuation which assigns to every propositional variable the intermediate
value is a counterexample for any inference (since no formula receives a classical value in
this valuation).
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Only if: By reductio, assume ϕ WKdd ψ but V ar(ψ) * V ar(ϕ). Hence,
there must be some propositional letter p, such that p ∈ V ar(ψ) but
p /∈ V ar(ϕ). Now, take any WK-valuation v, such that v(q) ∈ {t, f},
for every q ∈ V ar(ϕ) and v(p) = u. Since all of the operations of WK
are such that the output of classical inputs is a classical input and u is
an infectious element, it’s easy to check that the valuation v will be a
counterexample to ϕ WKdd ψ, which contradicts what we have assumed.
Following this, we prove that: ϕ WK
dd
ψ iff V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(ψ).
If: By reductio, assume V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(ψ) but ϕ 2WK
dd
ψ. Hence, there is a
WK-valuation v, such that v(ϕ) = u but v(ψ) ∈ {t, f}. Then, there
must be some propositional letter p ∈ V ar(ϕ), such that v(p) = u but
because of the infectiousness of u, v(q) ∈ {t, f}, for every q ∈ V ar(ψ).
So p /∈ V ar(ψ), which contradicts our initial assumption.
Only if: By reductio, assume ϕ WK
dd
ψ but V ar(ϕ) * V ar(ψ). Hence,
there must be some propositional letter p, such that p ∈ V ar(ϕ) but
p /∈ V ar(ψ). Now, take any WK-valuation v, such that v(q) ∈ {t, f},
for every q ∈ V ar(ψ) and v(p) = u. Since all of the operations of WK
are such that the output of classical inputs is a classical input and u is
an infectious element, it’s easy to check that the valuation v will be a
counterexample to ϕ WK
dd
ψ, which contradicts what we have assumed.
Fact 4.6. Variable inclusion can be defined over the Sobociński’s algebra as
follows:
ϕ Sdd ψ iff V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(ψ)
ϕ S
dd
ψ iff V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ)
Proof. We first prove that: ϕ Sdd ψ iff V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(ψ).
If: By reductio, assume V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(ψ) but ϕ 2Sdd ψ. Then, there must be
a S-valuation v, such that v(ϕ) ∈ {t, f} but v(ψ) = u. It’s easy to check
that if v(ψ) = u then v(q) = u, for every propositional variable q ∈
V ar(ψ). But since V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(ψ), v(p) = u for every p ∈ V ar(ϕ),
and therefore v(ϕ) = u, which contradicts our initial assumption.
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Only if: By reductio, assume ϕ Sdd ψ but V ar(ϕ) * V ar(ψ). Hence, there
must be some propositional letter p, such that p ∈ V ar(ϕ) but p /∈
V ar(ψ). Now, take any S-valuation v, such that v(q) = u, for every q ∈
V ar(ψ) and v(p) ∈ {t, f}. Because of the immune behavior of u, it’s
straightforward to check that the valuation v will be a counterexample
to ϕ Sdd ψ, which contradicts what we have assumed.
Following this, we prove that: ϕ S
dd
ψ iff V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ).
If: By reductio, assume V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ) but ϕ 2S
dd
ψ. Hence, there is a
S-valuation v, such that v(ϕ) = u but v(ψ) ∈ {t, f}. Then, because
of the properties of the immune element in S, v(p) = u for every
propositional letter p ∈ V ar(ϕ). But since V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ), v(q) = u
for every propositional letter q ∈ V ar(ψ). Hence, v(ψ) /∈ {t, f}, which
contradicts our initial assumption.
Only if: By reductio, assume ϕ S
dd
ψ but V ar(ψ) * V ar(ϕ). Hence, there
must be some propositional letter p, such that p ∈ V ar(ψ) but p /∈
V ar(ϕ). Now, take any S-valuation v, such that v(q) = u, for every
q ∈ V ar(ϕ) and v(p) ∈ {t, f}. Now, it’s straightforward to check that
this valuation v will be a counterexample to ϕ S
dd
ψ, which contradicts
what we have assumed.
So, the valid inferences in each of these logics are exactly those that
respect the corresponding variable inclusion. Thus, we have a semantic char-
acterization of this syntactic property. With this in place it’s evident that
the intersective mixed consequence relation between one of these logics and
a logic L will characterize exactly the fragment of L which respect the corre-
sponding variable inclusion. This is what the following corollary claim:
Corollary 4.7. Given a logic L, its set of valid inferences such that V ar(ψ) ⊆
V ar(ϕ) coincides with the intersective mixed consequence relation: S
dd
∩ L,
and with WKdd ∩ L.
Corollary 4.8. Given a logic L, its set of valid inferences such that V ar(ϕ) ⊆





In these cases the proofs are immediate from the Facts 4.5 and 4.6. In
particular, since in the last section we have seen that the only thing coming
between WKss and the fragment of Classical Logic that respects subject-
matter preservation from premise to conclusion are the antitheorems, and
the relations WKdd and 
S
dd
semantically characterize subject-matter preser-
vation from premise to conclusion, it is easy to see that there intersective
consequence relations WKss ∩ WKdd and WKss ∩ Sdd characterize the desired
fragment of Classical Logic.
Similarly, since in the last section we have seen that the only thing com-
ing between WKtt and the fragment of Classical Logic that respects subject-
matter preservation from conclusion to premise are the theorems, and the
relations WK
dd
and Sdd semantically characterize subject-matter preserva-
tion from conclusion to premise, it is easy to see that there intersective con-
sequence relations WKtt ∩ WKdd and 
WK
tt ∩ Sdd characterize the desired
fragment of Classical Logic.
Finally, it can be further observed that the intersection of any of these
intersective consequence relations leads to the fragment of Classical Logic
where all the propositional values of the premises are equal to those of the
proposition variables in the conclusions, which can be seen as the fragment of
Classical Logic that respects subject-matter equality between premises and
conclusion. This will give a semantic characterization of this system in terms
of the intersection of consequence relations, which is independent of other
characterizations that have been given in the literature, e.g., in [9].
5 Conclusion
In this article we have introduced and discussed a family of logics that we
referred to as immune logics—whose properties can be seen as related, in a
way, to the infectious logics. We noticed that immune logics are characterized
by containing a truth-value that behaves as an all-purpose identity element
for all the binary operations of the underlying algebra, and which is also
idempotent for all unary operations. In the 3-element case, we have called
the algebra uniquely determined by these ideas that extends the 2-element
Boolean algebra, the Sobociński algebra. Also, we have shown that these
immune systems are adequate to characterize some variable-inclusion frag-
ments of any logic, in particular, by taking the intersection of some mixed
consequence relations defined over the Sobociński algebra.
48
In these explorations, we have sadly left out some very interesting topics.
Firstly, it would be interesting to consider algebras with more than three
truth-values, containing not only an immune truth-value but also a truth-
value behaving in an infectious way. In this vein, it seems that the works
by Paoli [23] and Szmuc [29, 30] can be seen as witnesses of the fruitfulness
of considering systems of these sorts. Secondly, we have defined immune
elements for binary operations, and we have shown the problems of extending
it to n-ary operations, when n ≥ 3. We leave open whether these problems
can be solved and we hope to investigate them in future work.
Finally, it could also be interesting to consider some other systems related
to infectious logics, which could equally deserve the title of immune logics—
although for different reasons. Instead of considering algebras that have
a truth-value behaving in a value-in-value-out fashion, we could consider
for instance structures containing a truth-value that behaves in a value-in-
different-value-out manner. These may require considering different algebras
extending the 2-element Boolean algebra, and it may or may not be possible
to collect them altogether in a non-deterministic set of truth-tables, or a
non-deterministic algebra. We hope to investigate these and other related
topics in future work.
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